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The Bearing of Studies of Expertise and Experience (SEE) on Ethnography. 
Abstract 
Atkinson and Morriss (2016) explore the kinds of expertise and competence needed by 
ethnographic researchers. In doing so, they refer to the work of Collins and Evans, and in 
particular the idea of interactional expertise, which they dismiss as largely unhelpful to 
their project. In this response, we show that the Atkinson and Morriss miss-represent this 
work in important ways and that, if these mistakes are corrected, interactional expertise 
provides a useful way of addressing the methodological concerns they identify. 
Key Words 
Ethnography; New Methods & Methodologies; Qualitative Research; Qualitative Criteria 
Introduction 
Atkinson and Morriss (2016; hereafter A+M) have produced a classification of styles of 
ethnographic work which turns on the extent to which the ethnographer understands or 
participates in the life and practices of those studied.  Their project is descriptive rather 
than evaluative and they take the existence of a body of ethnographic work in a certain 
style as a warrant for claiming something like ‘ethnographic work can be done this way 
among other ways’.  Nevertheless, they intend that their classification will relate methods 
of ethnographic work to various possible intended purposes. 
Among their theoretical inputs is a discussion of our, Collins and Evans’s (C+E), 
approach to the analysis of expertise which we describe under the heading of ‘Studies of 
Expertise and Experience’, with the acronym SEE.   A+M concentrate, though not 
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exclusively, on SEE’s notions of ‘interactional expertise’ and ‘contributory expertise’ 
(Collins & Evans, 2002, 2007).  This is useful as we have not been assiduous about 
drawing the link between what we have done and ethnography.  Much of our work is 
based on our own quasi-participatory studies of, respectively, gravitational wave physics 
(45 years in duration and 5 books) and economic modelling (about 5 years duration and 
one book), and we have not done much in the way of comparing this with the 
ethnography methods literature.  In this respect, we have fallen into the silo mentality that 
characterises some academic fields of research.   
On the one hand, then, we are delighted that A+M have revealed the mutual relevance of 
the two approaches and started to explore more systematically a topic that we have 
overlooked in our theoretical and methodological work (e.g. Collins et al., 2015; Collins, 
Evans, Ribeiro, & Hall, 2006; Collins & Evans, 2014). On the other hand, we are 
disappointed that A+M have not fully escaped their own silo.  Thus  A+M describe our 
work as ‘unhelpful’ on no less than three occasions while mischaracterising the concepts 
they address and neglecting published work that would have saved them from a number 
of misunderstandings.  Here we aim to help to round out A+M’s initiative by filling in the 
gaps and showing that what they call unhelpful approaches are actually helpful to the 
project of ethnography.  In the discussion we’ll include some recent publications to which 
A+M would not have had easy access given the absence of personal contact;1 all the ideas 
                                                 
1
 Ethnographers of academic life might be intrigued to note that Atkinson, Collins and 
Evans have had offices in the same corridor of the same university department for over 
15 years but C+E knew nothing of the A+M paper and its criticisms of the C+E approach 
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have been there in the literature in a dispersed way for a while but these recent 
publications gather a lot together in one place.  They are Collins and Evans (2015), which 
explains the origins and significance of the idea of ‘interactional expertise’, and Collins 
(2016) which draws together the whole SEE program and is easy to access and is a brief 
read (the Introduction, which is about the relationship between sociology and philosophy, 
can be skipped).  A third paper, which we mention because A+M do spend some time on 
the notion of ‘contributory expertise’, is Collins, Evans, & Weinel (2016), though we 
won’t talk about that concept here.  
In their discussion of our work, A+M say our approach is ‘unhelpful’ in the following 
three ways: 
1. Our notion of ubiquitous expertise ‘blunts any distinction between expert or 
esoteric knowledge and everyday or common-sense knowledge’ (p. 4). 
2. We should not have categorised certain ‘further forms of knowledge [that] can be 
highly pertinent for ethnographic understanding’ as ‘meta-expertise’ (p. 5) 
3. That we take the need for the analyst to acquire what we call the ‘practice 
language’ of any group being studied to be the central feature of ethnographic 
method means that our ‘model of knowledge-ethnography [is] limited simply to 
                                                 
until Google Scholar, in an automated report of citations, revealed that it had been 
published; a short conversation prior to the completion of the paper could have resolved 
many of the problems.  For an example of how to do things differently, see the paper by 
Collins and Reber entitled ‘Ships that Pass in the Night’ (Collins & Reber, 2013).  
Collins and Reber created this attempt at a silo-breaching dialogue at a distance of 6,000 
miles from each other without ever having met. 
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interaction [with the idea of interactional expertise] based specifically on the 
interests of the sociologist, and on sociology practiced through interviews.’ (p. 5) 
We will show that each of these claims is wrong or misplaced before returning to the 
central question that concerns both ourselves and A+M: what kinds of knowledge and 
expertise does an ethnographer need to acquire? 
Ubiquitous and Esoteric Expertises 
A+M argue that the category of ‘ubiquitous expertise’, which they correctly characterise 
as the ‘mundane knowledge that is the stock-in-trade of any or all competent, skillful 
social actors’ (p4), makes it harder to distinguish between expert/esoteric knowledge and 
everyday/common-sense knowledge. Here they confusing two separate ways of thinking 
about expertise – expertise as a status that is granted to social actors and expertise as the 
possession of socially relevant knowledge that may or may not be valued by participants.  
Thus they fail to see that the idea of ubiquitous expertise makes possible a new 
distinction because it draws attention to ‘esotericity’ as a dimension of expertise.  
Consider the following examples, all of which turn on a recognising how the ubiquity or 
esotericity of expertise is a sociological phenomenon, not an epistemological one: 
 For the anthropologist studying a culture which is unfamiliar in his or her native 
society, the everyday understanding of how to go on within that society is 
ubiquitous to its native members but the very same understanding when brought 
back home by the anthropologist is esoteric – known only to the anthropologist or 
a small group of anthropologists. 
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 When driving a car was a pursuit available only the very few, the expertise 
involved would have seemed quite esoteric. Now many more people can drive so 
the same skills seem quite ubiquitous – indeed, it is even possible that driving a 
car is now even more demanding, precisely because it is ubiquitous, than it was 
when the expertise was esoteric 
 Psychological approaches, which define expertise in terms of individual 
accomplishment and practice – e.g. ‘an expertise takes 10,000 hour to learn’ 
(Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Römer, 1993) – will sometimes be referring to the 
same body of knowledge as an expertise and sometimes as not an expertise 
because everyone in a society possesses it. The paradigm example is native 
language-speaking; thus, English speaking in England, where it is not seen as an 
expertise, whereas in France it is a skill for the exercise of which one can be paid.  
What has gone un-noticed is the 10,000 hours plus that children spend learning 
ubiquitous expertises like their native language. A similar oversight characterises 
much of the early AI research which often started from the assumption that 
language was not an expertise and that early computers would find it easy to 
learn. 
In fact, the ubiquitous-esoteric dimension, is just one of three dimensions that SEE uses 
to characterise expertise. The other two are the proficiency of the individual practitioner 
and the extent to which the learner has access to the tacit knowledge of the domain. The 
model, which is helpful if you want to understand what kinds of expertise can be (or have 
been) acquired and how this relates to an expertise being ubiquitous or esoteric, is 
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summarised in Figure 1 (below, first published in Collins, 2013, but see also Collins, 
2016). 
 
 Figure 1: Expertise space diagram or ‘three-dimensional model of expertise. 
 
As can be seen, the regular psychological or stage-theory approach is shown on the axis 
going into the page (the Z-axis) with esotericity vertical (Y-axis) and the extent to which 
the putative acquirer of expertise is exposed to the tacit knowledge of the domain through 
full socialisation or immersion in the discourse shown left-to-right (X-axis).  As Collins 
(2013b) and, much more briefly Collins (2016) show, one can represent all kinds of 
trajectories of expertise using this framework and one can use it in various different 
ways. 
Exposure to tacit knowledge of domain 
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Individual or group 
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Meta-Expertise 
The next way in which SEE is said to be unhelpful is in describing certain expertises as 
‘meta-expertise’, or expertises used to judge other expertises.  Meta-expertisea are the 
fourth line on the Periodic Table of Expertises which is shown in Figure 2 and is first 
found in Collins and Evans, 2007.   
 
Figure 2: The Periodic Table of Expertises 
We don’t understand why the notion of meta-expertises is considered unhelpful as it 
seems vital to us and this is the first time it has been subject to criticism.  A+M do not 
explain the problem and we can only assume it is another case of what they see as the 
‘blunting’ of categories that follows from referring to ‘everything as expertise’. Of 
course, if this really is their concern, we would reply that, as with the distinction between 
ubiquitous and esoteric, the adjective is important in distinguishing what kind of 
1 UBIQUITOUS EXPERTISES 
 2 
DISPOSITIONS  
Interactive Ability  
                              Reflective Ability 
 
3  
 
SPECIALIST 
EXPERTISES 
UBIQUITOUS 
 TACIT KNOWLEDGE 
SPECIALIST  
TACIT KNOWLEDGE 
Beer-mat 
Knowledge 
Popular 
Understanding 
Primary 
Source 
Knowledge 
Interactional 
Expertise 
Contributory 
Expertise 
   
Polimorphic 
                                Mimeomorphic 
 
4 
META-
EXPERTISES 
EXTERNAL 
(Transmuted expertises) 
INTERNAL 
(Non-transmuted expertises) 
Ubiquitous 
Discrimination 
Local  
Discrimination 
Technical 
Connoisseurship 
Downward 
Discrimination 
Referred 
Expertise 
 5  META- 
CRITERIA Credentials Experience Track-Record 
9 
 
expertise is being referred to.2 In the case of meta-expertise, the adjective signals that 
these are not judgements made by the practitioner’s peer group but by others, relying on 
the forms of expertise and experience that the wider society makes available for judging 
expertise and expert performance.  
That said, we recognise that the Periodic Table of Expertises is a work in progress and 
must be subject to the usual scientific process of critique and revision.  For example, over 
the years we have realised that there is some bleeding of meta-expertise into the higher 
levels of specialist expertise (interactional expertise and contributory expertise) in the 
form of what we call ‘Domain Specific Discrimination’ (Collins et al., 2016; Collins & 
Weinel, 2011).  Domain specific discrimination is the non-technical judgment made by 
experts within an esoteric domain of the expertise of other experts within that domain, 
this being one of the ways that, for example, consensus in an esoteric science is 
developed (Collins, 1992)  Whether this is a separate form of expertise, simply a 
component of interactional expertise or a capacity that comes with the acquisition of 
interactional expertise is something that could be debated further. 
Likewise, we are not entirely happy with our understanding of connoisseurship. For 
example, to what extent does it depend on possessing interactional expertise in the 
domain being judged and/or to what extent is skilled consumption a practice, and hence 
                                                 
2
 We would also add, though this is not a point made by A+M, expertise needs to be tied 
to a domain. Rather than talk about expertise, we would much prefer to talk about 
interactional expertise in flower arranging or technical connoisseurship in experimental 
design. 
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specialist, contributory expertise, in its own right?  Thus, though we think the details of 
the meta-expertise row need working on, we think the concept itself is sound and 
essential to any analysis of expertise – and it is, indeed, one of the central concepts in 
philosophers’ analysis of the assessment of expertise by the public (e.g. Goldman, 2001). 
Interactional Expertise 
In their treatment of interactional expertise as ‘unhelpful’ that A+M go even more  
damagingly wrong than in the other cases.  The say: 
The model of knowledge-ethnography proposed by Collins is consequently 
unhelpfully limited simply to interaction. Indeed, the original formulation of 
interactional expertise seems to be based specifically on the interests of the 
sociologist, and on sociology practised through interviews.  (our stress) 
There are at least two different mistakes here. The first, and less serious one, is the 
reduction of interactional expertise to sociological fieldwork interviews. A+M are correct 
to say that the first publication to use the term ‘interactional expertise’ (Collins & Evans, 
2002) did use fieldwork practices as a way of illustrating the concept but, even then it 
was part of a much bigger argument about the role of the social analyst in evaluating 
claims to expert status.  But the idea of interactional expertise has much deeper origins, 
going back to 1996 (Collins, 1996), as set out in Collins (2004), and more fully and 
accessibly explained in Collins and Evans (2016). 
The second, more serious mistake, is the way in which language appears is 
misunderstood by A+M.  They draw a sharp contrast between language and practice 
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whereas fluent language-speaking is a practice.  They somehow treat the acquisition of 
fluency in a language, or practice language, by immersion in the spoken discourse of the 
domain, as something that does not count as social interaction.  They say that in stressing 
the centrality of learning the language we are advocating non-participatory (!) research 
methods as though acquiring fluency in a language did not, by definition, imply 
participation within a society.  There is a philosophical argument about the extent to 
which this participation can rely on linguistic socialisation alone, with us claiming that, in 
principle, interactional expertise can be acquired solely through linguistic socialisation 
but this is still participation.  More physical and embodied participation speeds the whole 
thing up and makes for a much more efficient process but even where interaction is as 
purely linguistic as such a thing can be (as when one of the parties is physically incapable 
of more extended physical engagement) becoming fluent is still interacting.  Further 
arguments follow below. 
Succulently, much of what has just been argued is necessary to make sense of A+M’s 
own description of aspects of their ethnographic world.  Thus, Atkinson describes his 
engagement in the world of opera and points out that he could not be said to be a full 
practitioner in that world despite his substantial knowledge of opera, excellent access and 
long immersion.  He says:  
there was no single body of expertise [that could be acquired] … It would imply – 
possibly as a prerequisite to conducting the fieldwork – vulgar competence as a 
solo singer, a member of the chorus, an orchestral musician, a conductor, a 
repetiteur, a set designer, a director, a stage manager, a crew member, a carpenter, 
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a lighting technician, a dramaturg, an artistic administrator, and so on. In many 
settings, after all, there is a complex division of labour. In order to study how 
social actors work together, it is neither desirable nor feasible to become expert at 
all they know individually. However, the ethnographer does need to be able to 
make sense of the talk between various actors and this does require a certain level 
of competence. (p. 3, our stress) 
Making sense of the talk between actors is acquiring interactional expertise.  That’s not 
just a word for something that everyone understands already because the idea has many 
ramifications.  One of these is that each of the actors who engage in an enterprise 
characterised by a complex division of labour must also be an interactional expert in all 
the other specialist practices with which they must coordinate their actions yet without 
practising those practices and, usually, without being capable of practicing those 
practices; an opera company is a perfect illustration.  Being an interactional expert means 
having a fluency in the practice language that enables one to make sound practical 
judgments in respect of practices that one cannot practice.3  Language, at a level of 
fluency that embodies tacit knowledge in its form, substance and silences, makes division 
                                                 
3
 See Collins and Sanders (2007) for a discussion of the concept between Collins and the 
one-time Project Manager of the Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory 
(LIGO) and now Manager of the 30-Meter Telescope project.  Sanders explains that 
interactional expertise is what he uses to deal with all the different practices he must 
direct. 
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of labour possible and, in exactly the same way, makes ethnography possible.4  The 
ethnographer, however deeply immersed in a native society, cannot possibly be practising 
every practice just as we do not practice every practice within our own societies.  Most of 
what we understand about our own societies we understand through the language we 
speak.  Aspiring to know the relevant language fluently does not in any way limit the 
research ‘simply to interaction’ – the notion is utterly incoherent.     
The thrust of the argument from language does, of course, fly in the face of a long 
tradition of phenomenological analysis associated with Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, 
Todes, Dreyfus and others.5 Yet it just has to be the case or we cannot make sense of our 
world – for instance we would not be able to understand the division of labour nor the 
fluency of the congenitally physically challenged without the idea of interactional 
                                                 
4
 One wonders if there is any society with a language that does not have a division of 
labour.   
5
 One of the strangest of A+M’s criticisms of our work is that ‘Collins and Evans rely 
almost exclusively on the five-stage model summarised by Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986)’.  
They go on to say we share Dreyfus’s faults, in particular not understanding that some 
ethnographers do not just sit back and think about skills like driving but actually engage 
in the practices of those they study.  In response, first we do not rely on the Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus model and many criticisms of it will be found in our writings.  For a recent 
critique of the Dreyfus position in general see Collins (2016 forthcoming).  Furthermore, 
in our work there are many instances of our participating in the work we analyse. For 
example, in gravitational wave physics Collins tried to participate in the discussion of 
‘little dogs’ (Collins, 2013a, Appendix 4).  Collins has also helped to put lasers together 
and published research in parapsychology and in the area of computerised expert systems 
and built an expert system to guide the creation of semi-conductors.  But, more 
important, the notion of ubiquitous expertise shows that we are participating all the time 
and a more careful analysis of what ethnographers do shows that, except under 
remarkable circumstances, they cannot be physically participating in anything but a small 
part of the activities they analyse. 
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expertise.  The way interactional expertise operates in domains characterised by division 
of labour, and the position of the ethnographer within such fields, is explained by Collins 
in his paper ‘Language and Practice’ (Collins, 2011).  This paper shows how Atkinson’s 
immersion in the world of opera could work by explaining how Collins’s immersion in 
the world of gravitational wave physics did work.  So, once more, the idea of 
interactional expertise seems more helpful than unhelpful.   
This is such an important point that it is worth repeating.  It is simply not true, as A+M 
say, that ‘privileging spoken interaction in the absence of participation (participant 
observation) or the personal acquisition of practical competence is an apologia for non-
ethnographic investigation.’  Atkinson himself has to privilege spoken interaction if he is 
to claim that he is doing something other than ‘non-ethnographic investigation’ in respect 
of every aspect of opera other than that in which he is practically accomplished!  A+M 
simply have not thought through the complicated relationship between what we know 
through language and what we know through practice – they are simply confused; spoken 
interaction, if it is fluent, is participation.  The fundamental relationship between 
ethnographers and those they study is that the ethnographer hangs around the 
practitioners in order to learn to understand their practices through acquiring their 
language.  Where there is no division of labour, more embodied practice might be 
possible but exactly what it delivers aside from access is not so clear given that the 
ethnographer has to be able to understand things that he or she does not practice.  Where 
there is any significant division of labour, it is logistically impossible for qualitative 
research to be done in any other way.   
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Imitation Games 
There is another aspect of SEE that is not mentioned at all by A+M but which we have 
suggested might be helpful to ethnographers and other participatory fieldworkers.  This is 
the ‘Imitation Game’ (we capitalize to refer to our technically developed method).  Alan 
Turing based his famous idea that has become known as the ‘Turing Test’ on a parlour 
game in which a hidden man pretended to be a woman when answering questions from a 
‘judge’ while a hidden woman answered the same questions for comparison.  Turing 
replaced the man with a computer.  We have developed the Imitation Game as a full-scale 
method for testing the extent to which one person or group understands the culture of 
another – the extent to which one group or person possesses the interactional expertise of 
another (Collins, forthcoming; Collins et al., 2015; Collins & Evans, 2014).  Hundreds of 
games can be run on a national scale to look at the competence of groups pretending to be 
other groups (such as secular people pretending to be religious and vice versa), through to 
a dozen or so games on a small group (such as the blind pretending to be sighted and vice 
versa), down to the testing of individuals (such as Collins pretending to be a gravitational 
wave physicist).  In the last form it is a way for ethnographers, anthropologists, and so 
forth to test their native competence rather than just talk about it.  Thus Collins did pass 
as a gravitational wave physicist (Giles, 2006) and in a more recent test did quite well 
again, this time comparing his abilities with those of astrophysicists and sociologists 
(Collins, 2017, Chapter 14; also available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1607.07373).  The test is 
very easy to carry out in computer literate societies, either by getting someone to set 
questions and organize the answers over email or by using a specialized ‘app’ that we 
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have developed for Apple and Android devices6.  In non-computer literate societies, more 
ingenuity might be required.  Now, the idea of testing one’s native competence is 
forbidding but there is no suggestion that a competent ethnographer has always to ‘pass’.  
The test can be used as a way of thinking about ones expertise and where it is lacking and 
is even valuable as a thought experiment without actually carrying it through.       
Varieties of ethnography 
A+M start with a clear and valuable project – ‘What kind and what level of competence 
can and should the ethnographer seek to attain?’ – but they choose to dodge their own 
question. Their paper offers a rough categorisation of ways in which ethnographers can 
engage with those they study but they ultimately avoid any evaluation, arguing instead 
that:   
there is no single answer to the question. Indeed, one really needs to turn the 
question round. There is clearly no one level or type of knowledge that can be 
aspired to. The competence achieved by the ethnographer must clearly depend to 
a considerable extent on the project in hand. (p. 7) 
Now, quite apart from whether A+M want to evaluate the expertise needed to conduct 
ethnographic research, they would not be able to use their categorisation to do so.  The 
categorisation (pp 6-7) goes as follows: 
                                                 
6
 Information about the app can be found at: http://blogs.cardiff.ac.uk/imgame 
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Practical competence. Practical competence means that one can actually perform 
to a given level. The novice can undertake basic tasks to a moderate level. 
Critical competence or connoisseurship. There is a range of competence that 
depends on the ability to offer an informed opinion about performance. The 
connoisseur or aficionado is capable of applying fine discriminations in 
evaluating and classifying styles and levels of performative skill. Obviously, the 
professional critic is a key exemplar. 
Situational competence. Situational competence reflects a degree of enculturation, 
to the extent that the fully socialised member is tacitly versed in the ordinary and 
special forms of social encounter, has interactional competence in dealing with 
fellow members, and can sustain unselfconscious social interaction. 
Descriptive competence. Descriptive or recognition competence allows the 
observer to identify and to describe cases, types and instance. The bird-watcher 
can exercise such competence in distinguishing between species, and can describe 
the characteristic shape and markings of each. Commentary competence is a 
variant, based on an analogy with the sports commentator on TV or radio. 
Pedagogical competence. The competent pedagogue possesses enough practical, 
advanced competence to be able to instruct and coach others. 
But these are not distinct categories of expertise, they are aspirations for different kinds 
of ethnographic output. As forms of expertise, they come all mixed up as one immerses 
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oneself in a new society, allowing processes of socialisation to run their course.  If one 
can converse fluently one might well have acquired at least one practical competence 
because it is through practice that entry is most usually achieved (though bear in mind the 
case of technical managers and what we call ‘special interactional experts’ – Collins and 
Sanders, 2007, Collins, 2011), and one is going to be able to be comfortable in the typical 
social situations in which conversation takes place and one will be able to teach people 
about that society and its ways of going on.  These categories cannot be distinguished in 
anything other than an analytic way.  That’s why the Turing Test and the Imitation Game 
are so powerful: demonstrate fluency and you demonstrate social understanding.  Even a 
macho enthusiast for artificial intelligence and believer in the coming ‘singularity’, when 
computers will take over the world, understands this; Ray Kurzweil, does not believe the 
Turing Test will be passed until 2029.  He says: ‘There is no set of tricks or algorithms 
that would allow a machine to pass a properly designed Turing test without actually 
possessing intelligence at a fully human level.’7  For Turing test read ‘Imitation Game’ 
and for ‘intelligence’ read ‘cultural understanding.   
Note that the above paragraph does not cover one category -- Critical competence or 
connoisseurship.  That’s because it is something quite different to the others – it is not an 
expertise but a meta-expertise.  And there are certainly institutions and cultural domains, 
such as art or theatre criticism, where what counts as definitive critical acumen and 
                                                 
7
 This remark can be found in Kurzweil (2002, and 2005, p. 505).   
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connoisseurship does not require any ability to practice within, talk within, or, in the 
opinion of at least some of the practitioners, even understand the domain being judged.   
That category aside, the ability to converse fluently within a domain, which can be tested, 
or at least thought about, via the Imitation Game, represents a general measure of cultural 
competence in that domain and a point from which one can begin to ask the question – 
what level should ethnographers and other participatory researchers aspired to achieve? 
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